The posturing of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the border regions shared with India surfacing in the backdrop of its shifting strategy from continental to peripheral defence tends to underline the Chinese military’s doctrinal intent of resolving to “fight and win local wars on its borders.” What appears to emerge is that the Chinese leadership under President Xi Jinping is continuing the previous administration’s policy of ensuring that the western development strategy continues, which further would guarantee its firm control over regions in western China. Upon his return from India in September 2014, Xi was quoted as saying by the state-run Xinhua news agency, “Headquarters of all People’s Liberation Army forces should improve their combat readiness and sharpen their ability to win a regional war in the age of information technology.” Besides, a senior officer with the PLA’s General Staff Headquarters, Wu Xihua, affirmed earlier at a press conference in Beijing that the basic duty of the armed forces is to fight wars, while its mission in times of peace is to prepare for war.

In a series of capability-enhancing initiatives, the latest one came in the form of China upgrading the status of Major General Tang Xiao, the political commissar of the Tibet Armed Police Corps, to that of becoming head of a Corps-size military body. What is noteworthy is while that the Tibet Corps itself has not been upgraded, the elevation of the Police Corps, has been hailed as a major decision “based on the special environment and strategic position of the Tibet Armed Police”, none less than by Niu Zhizhong, Chief of Staff of the Armed Police of Tibet.

Before the setting in of winter in Tibet, transportation regiments of the Qinghai-Tibet Corps of the PLA undertook massive cargo transportation in October 2014 for the PLA troops stationed here. Chinese state-controlled media reported a motorcade of a truck transportation regiment parked for being loaded with cargoes at a troop’s warehouse near the Nachitai army service station, crossing the Tuotuo River and the Tanggula Mountains Pass on the Qinghai-Tibet Highway in the Anduo County, south-west of the Tibet Autonomous Region. These efforts for sure shall accentuate the enhanced ability of the PLA towards becoming a more mobile and better-equipped fighting force, which can be deployed faster and sustained over a longer period of time across the high altitudes of the Tibetan plateau and provide all-inclusive support for any potential offensive operation outside of its mainland.

The Chinese Government promulgated the “Great Western Development” strategy in 1999, and since then has systematically invested heavily on the logistics and infrastructure development all through western China. From a military perspective, this infrastructure and logistics build-up shall double up critically as base support for the PLA and be vital in improving the rapid deployment capability of China’s integrated forces, particularly the ability to swiftly manoeuvre heavy equipment to and from the region.

Xu Qiliang, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC)—the highest state military organ commanding China’s entire armed forces, has averred that the military should prioritise addressing issues that affect their most immediate interests. While speaking at a meeting in Beijing devoted to addressing the cause of bolstering the PLA’s role in the development of China’s west, Xu “ordered the military to make utmost efforts to maintain border security, enhance solidarity between the military, local governments and the public, as well as to uphold ethnic solidarity.” In this reference, Xu Qiliang’s comment that “the prosperity, development and stability of western regions are of strategic importance to national security and development” only tends to regurgitate that thought. The strategy to accentuate development of China’s western frontier, which crucially includes the Tibetan Autonomous Region, has been well conceived and executed. Today, the 13th and 14th combined Corps falling under the Chengdu Military Region vouches PLA’s firm grip over Tibet. In fact, Xu Qiliang urged the military to be fully aware that helping develop China’s west will boost the military’s capacity to carry out diversified tasks. The Xi Jinping Administration further holds that fundamentally, the diversified employment of the armed forces is meant to safeguard national territorial sovereignty, as well as provide firm security guarantees. The diversified employment of Chinese armed forces aims to contain crises, strengthen combat-readiness, readily respond to and resolutely deter any provocative action which undermines China’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity and firmly safeguard China’s core national interests.

The Chinese Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the CMC have outlined that combat effectiveness is the sole fundamental criterion for the management and use of military expenditure. Having completed construction of the fifth-generation barracks of the Simhana Frontier Defence Company under the Xinjiang military area Command (MAC), the PLA activities in the high-altitude military terrain have received a boost. According to the Housing Office of the PLA’s Xinjiang MAC, the fifth-generation multifunctional barracks are available in all frontier defence companies with an elevation of 3,000 metres and above.

Given the fact that most frontier defence companies and sentry posts are stationed on snow-capped mountainous terrain including plateaus at altitudes of over 3,000 metres, the fifth-generation barracks, costing China over 14 million yuan, comes in as a critical achievement at those heights. Earlier, incomplete domestic installations and lack of heat preservation in the older barracks posed difficulties vis-à-vis credible frontier defence. The decision to invest in constructing and renovating logistics facilities of high-altitude companies including at Shenxianwan, began way back in 2007 as per directives of the CMC and the General Headquarters of the PLA, the Lanzhou military area command and the Xinjiang MAC.

Moreover, the newly constructed and commissioned barracks of the Biedieli frontier defence company are equipped reportedly with “ten major systems” including direct-drinking water purification system, solar-powered and boiler bathing system, solar-powered and diesel engine generating system, boiler heating and a solar heating system. It has been reported by the PLA that all grassroots companies have been equipped with satellite televisions and availability of Internet in nearly 90 per cent of the organic battalions and companies. That field operations’ living support enhances and improves combat effectiveness is a given, it is very crucial to note that the PLA has already implemented the “oxygen-inhaling project” in PLA’s plateau troop units.

The past few years have witnessed exceptional PLAF activity on the Qinghai-Tibet plateau, with the PLAF in the Chengdu Military Area Command holding live ammunition drills, during which it carried out surgical strikes at night by testing the multi-role J-10 fighter jets, in a “first operation of its kind.” China’s state-controlled media reported that the ground crew of the J-10 regiment fuelled the fighters and loaded ammunition on the 3,500-metrehigh plateau at temperatures below -20 degree Celsius. The J-10 fighters attacked targets with conventional as well as laserguided bombs, in what could be interpreted as circumspect strategy for air space denial capability. In addition the PLA Army has already been rehearsing capture of mountain passes at heights beyond 5,000 metres with the help of armoured vehicles and airborne troops. In fact, the Chinese Ministry of Defence declared this in an official report, describing the exercise as the “first joint actual-troop drill of the PLA air and ground troops under information-based conditions in frigid area with a high altitude”. Needless to reiterate that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is preparing for a potential conflict situation especially in its high-altitude areas, with the Military Transportation Department of the PLAF Logistics Department overseeing the movement of “combat readiness materials” to Tibet – reflecting a growing PLAF role in maintaining security along the Sino-Indian border in the Tibetan area.

Dr Monika Chansoria is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, and a columnist on foreign policy and strategic affairs for The Sunday Guardian newspaper.