The proposal of a new corps, including two independent infantry and two armoured brigades, would together cost around Rs. 81,000 crore, spread primarily over the Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012-17) period, with some spill over into the Thirteenth Plan

A mountain strike corps (MSC ) for the eastern theatre has been in the news now for some time. The Cabinet approval for the same was reported some time ago. The latest reference about this strike corps was made in the first and second week of February 2013 when it was mentioned that apart from the strike corps for the mountains, the Army also desired to raise two independent infantry brigades and two independent armoured brigades.

It seems that the proposal was first mooted in 2010 and given in-principle clearance by the government in 2011.The plan involved recruiting of over 80,000 soldiers and nearly 500 officers to man the strike corps, an offensive formation, to counter China’s growing capabilities across the border in Tibet. It was then estimated that the new corps would cost about Rs. 65,000 crore. India has no strike corps for the mountains whereas for the western border, India has three strike corps, which are trained and equipped for offensive operations against Pakistan, in plains, semi-desert and desert terrain. The headquarters of these three strike corps are located at Mathura, Ambala and Bhopal respectively, with the formations spread in Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan.

It was also reported in the media that the raising of the new formations, including two independent infantry and two armoured brigades would together cost about Rs. 81,000 crore, spread primarily over the Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012-17) period, with some spill over into the Thirteenth Plan.

The Finance Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) initially had raised their objections to such huge investments. The PMO had sent back the proposal to the Defence Ministry and had asked for a comprehensive joint proposal. The Chiefs of Staff Committee had tasked the Headquarter Integrated Defence Staff to come up with a revised draft for the mountain strike corps which seems to have now been approved. The proposal has now been given a final shape. This includes the raising of the corps which implies raising of three more infantry divisions (20,000 soldiers each), complete with tactical airlift capability and armed with necessary armoured regiments and artillery components. The Indian Air Force (IAF) has also projected its requirement in this plan. It includes deployment of the C-130J Hercules aircraft meant for special operations like para-dropping.

It has been reported in the media that the MSC is to be located in the eastern theatre, with its headquarters at Panagarh. The independent infantry and armoured brigades would have multiple contingencies for employment in Ladakh and in the eastern theatre.

Necessity for a Strike Corps in the Eastern Theatre

The requirement for a strike corps for the mountains in the eastern theatre has long been felt in the Army. After the debacle of 1962, India raised a large number of mountain formations to defend India’s borders in the North and East against China. Two more mountain divisions were raised recently in 2010-11 to ensure that all existing gaps are plugged and some reserves are available for tactical/operational level reactions in the eastern theatre based on the operational situations that may develop during hostilities. However, the eastern theatre had remained a low priority theatre as far as modernisation and induction of new weapon systems and “force multipliers” are concerned as compared to the western theatre due to the constant Pakistani threat and the imposition of 1965 and 1971 wars fought in fairly quick succession. This fact combined with the relative dormancy in the eastern theatre after 1962 war and the ongoing budgetary constraints, modernisation and capability building on both fronts, was simultaneously not considered feasible. Moreover, the weather conditions and the nature of mountainous terrain in the east also urged restraint in the introduction of new technologies in conducting warfare which were not considered to be so effective in the mountains. This resulted in accumulation of large voids in the inventory of the fighting formations located in the east. By the turn of the century and with the onset of the 21st century, it started becoming clearer that China was going to be our principle opponent in the future and the indicators were: China’s self image as a predominant power of South Asia; its aspirations to be a superpower by 2049; its compulsive use of Pakistan to keep India engaged on its western front and off balance militarily to pose any threat to it; its dismissive and derogatory approach towards India’s democratic experience; its strategy of encircling India through its neighbours and confining it within the subcontinent; its critical approach to India’s nuclear status; its negative disposition in allowing India to become a permanent member of the Security Council; and its unwillingness to resolve the border dispute. All served as warnings that India could not afford to ignore.

All nations who only try to defend their borders without going on the offensive at any stage during the war, generally ending up losing the territory and therefore in the war. Wars can never be won by remaining on the defensive throughout. Undertaking an offensive at an appropriate time can not only neutralise the opponent’s gains but also positively motivate the troops, thus ensuring a high morale of the military and of the nation as a whole. An offensive capability imparts flexibility to operational plans and gives a larger number of military options to the military commanders in order to achieve the political objectives of war and therefore politically and operationally an offensive capability is vital for winning a war. Moreover, an offensive capability can also serve as deterrence to an opponent who may otherwise be tempted to adopt an adventurist approach.

Many would ask the inevitable question regarding the necessity of increasing the density of defensive formations when offensive formations are in the process of being raised. The answer is quite simple and that is: a military commander must protect his launch pads or firm bases from where he can undertake offensives. He cannot afford to lose areas which provide lucrative avenues for launching his offensive operations which could reach out to capture vulnerable and vital terrain of the opponent and therefore heavier defensive density in such areas is a necessity to retain maximum options for launching offensive operations.

Types of Offensive Manoeuvres

Offensive manoeuvres in the mountains, especially the higher reaches, are constrained by the difficult terrain, the additional time taken to cover a given distance due to difficult terrain and high altitude effects, the generally adverse climatic conditions, the limitations on the loads that a soldier can carry at higher altitudes and the difficulty in establishing a logistic chain for replenishment of the units and formations who are required to move into enemy territory. As compared to the plains and desert terrain, an attack on a locality in the mountains, requires three to four times the number of troops as compared to the plains and far greater time. Hence the mountain formations have to be manpower intensive. There is also a constraint on the operational logistics in the mountains due to lack of adequate roads and tracks. Thus backup logistic support by air (both fixed-wing and rotarywing) becomes vital for the mountains.

The manoeuvres that can be adopted in the mountains at operational and strategic levels can be proactive or reactive. These are not very different from those adopted in the plains and deserts except for the fact that far greater time is required to conduct operations due to terrain and climate constraints combined with lowered human endurance in the higher altitudes. Movements on foot being very slow, deep operations planned can be executed by simultaneously employing helicopter-borne troops or airborne troops in the depth areas.

Reactive Operations

Counter-offensive: A counter-offensive is the term used to describe large-scale military manoeuvres usually at operational or military strategic levels by a defender who after successfully halting the enemy’s offensive, undertakes a counter-offensive manoeuvre in another sector to capture advantageous positions in enemy territory in order to either force him to move back from the positions occupied by him in our territory or to occupy such enemy territory in his depth areas which would give us post-war bargaining power. This is executed by specially trained and equipped strike formations. In the mountains, due to terrain constraints, manoeuvre by helicopter-borne troops and airborne troops assisted by ground formations, it would be the most preferred option. Military strategist Carl von Clausewitz considered a counter-offensive to be the most efficient means of forcing the attacker to abandon offensive plans.

Counter-strike: A counter-strike is aimed at destroying the firm base of the attacker. Essentially, therefore, a counterstrike is a shallow counter-offensive launched from one or both flanks of an enemy offensive. The defender, in the process of absorbing an offensive, strives to strike at the launch pad or firm base of the attacker by going behind the enemy lines. If this operation is carried out at a critical juncture when the attacker has sent most of his troops forward to advance deep into the defender’s territory and is relatively weak in his firm base area, then the defender through the counter-strike may stand a good chance of cutting off the axis of maintenance of the attacker, thus forcing him to retract his forces, as otherwise he faces the danger of being cut off logistically from his firm base.

Counter-attack: This manoeuvre is carried out in own territory to blunt and limit the offensive of the attacker by directly attacking and confronting his forces from the front and flanks. This manoeuvre, unlike the counterstrike, does not strive to go behind the enemy lines to attack his firm base but conducts the same operation from own side of the border. This is likely to be costly in terms of own casualties as it attempts to hit the enemy where he is likely to be strong. However, at times, the defender may be forced to undertake such an operation. In recent times, Kargil operations by India is an appropriate example of counter-attacks in our own territory as the government had laid the restriction of not crossing the line of control (LoC) into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK).